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SECTION 1983 ACTIONS IN NORTH DAKOTA:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF AGENCY POLICIES AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS
JARED RIGBY

I.

*

INTRODUCTION

Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States Code1 prohibits public
officials from violating individuals’ civil rights and liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution and federal law.2 The Act seeks to accomplish its objective
by providing a civil cause of action for plaintiffs whose civil rights and
liberties are infringed by government actors.3 Section 1983 is frequently
employed to sue state and local law enforcement and corrections officers.4
Although the legal elements of Section 1983 apply equally throughout the
United States, the effect of Section 1983 may vary depending on each
jurisdiction studied.5 For instance, individuals in some areas of the nation
seem to be particularly at risk of having their individual constitutional rights
violated.6 In other jurisdictions, however, the government appears to be
burdened by an unusual amount of frivolous Section 1983 claims.7
To date, no scholarly study has concentrated solely on the use or effect
of Section 1983 in North Dakota.8 As such, the first objective of this
*
Jared W. Rigby graduated from the University of North Dakota with Juris Doctorate and
Master of Public Administration degrees in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Jared gives the most
immediate thanks to his wife and children; their love, sacrifice, and support are priceless. Special
thanks also to Dr. Steven Andrew Light and Dr. Andy Hultquist for their friendship, patience, and
assistance.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. John L. Worrall, Culpability Standards in Section 1983 Litigation Against Criminal
Justice Officials: When and Why Mental State Matters, 47 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 28, 31-32
(2001).
5. See Darrell L. Ross, Emerging Trends in Correctional Civil Liability Cases: A Content
Analysis of Federal Court Decisions of Title 42 United States Code Section 1983: 1970-1994, 25
J. CRIM. JUST. 501, 511-12 (1997) (reporting that the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
United States Federal Circuits decided 60% of the cases studied and reasoning that “these five circuits share a common feature of large correctional populations, both at the prison and jail levels”).
6. See id. at 510 (determining that between 1970 and 1978, prisoners prevailed in 89% of
cases involving unjustified discipline).
7. See id. (showing that among the cases studied from 1987 to 1994, the government successfully defended itself in 90% of the Section 1983 claims involving allegations of speech
violations).
8. But see Michael S. Vaughn et al., Assessing Legal Liabilities in Law Enforcement: Police
Chiefs’ Views, 47 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 3, 6, 16-17 (2001) (presenting empirical findings
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project is to determine whether the burden imposed by Section 1983 on
North Dakota agencies is comparable to the burden shouldered by other
jurisdictions. In addition, this project seeks to discover the trends associated with Section 1983 claims (i.e., the constitutional amendments, provisions, and agency policies most frequently implicated), both generally and
in North Dakota specifically. Furthermore, the study provides recommendations by which North Dakota law enforcement and correctional agencies
may strengthen their administrative policies.
Comparative analysis involving the State of North Dakota, but unrelated to Section 1983 claims, occasionally report North Dakota to be unique
among the majority of other jurisdictions.9 In regard to the characteristic
trends of Section 1983 claims, however, the answer initially appears to be
that many of the national trends commonly associated with Section 1983
characteristics hold true in North Dakota. Within this large umbrella-like
hypothesis is a more finite and quantitatively based null hypothesis: there is
no statistical relationship between the North Dakota policies implicated in
Section 1983 claims and those policies implicated in other American
jurisdictions.
Section II contains a review of the literature and empirical studies
involving Section 1983 issues.10 Section III provides an explanation of the
methodology employed in the current study.11 The results of the study are
presented in Section IV.12 In Section V, the results of the current study are
discussed generally in light of empirical studies involving Section 1983
issues.13
relating to a quantitative study of Section 1983 liability among police chiefs in Texas); see also
Ross, supra note 5, at 507-12 (providing empirical data pertaining to Section 1983 claims in the
federal correctional setting generally).
9. See, e.g., Dean J. Hass, Falling Down on the Job: Workers’ Compensation Shifts From a
No-Fault to a Worker-Fault Paradigm, 79 N.D. L. REV. 203, 209 (2003) (“North Dakota is one of
five states that operate an exclusive state fund to insure workers’ compensation risk.”); see also,
e.g., Christopher Paul Fischer, “I Hear You Knocking, But You Can’t Come In”: The North
Dakota Supreme Court Again Declines to Decide Whether the State Constitution Precludes a
Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 588 N.W.2d 846, 76
N.D. L. REV. 123, 128 (2000) (stating that North Dakota has uniquely protected the privacy of an
individual’s home by maintaining legislation that requires law enforcement to knock-andannounce themselves prior to entry).
10. See discussion infra Part II (focusing on the history of Section 1983, the text and interpretations of Section 1983, and Section 1983 claims in law enforcement and corrections arenas).
11. See discussion infra Part III (studying all reported Section 1983 cases involving law
enforcement and correctional agencies in North Dakota between January 1997 and December
2007).
12. See discussion infra Part IV (reporting the agencies involved, characteristics of plaintiffs,
number of cases reported, legal authorities and arguments employed, and policies implicated).
13. See discussion infra Part V (analyzing whether Section 1983 is a burden to North Dakota
agencies, determining how the statistical trends of Section 1983 cases in North Dakota compare to
other jurisdictions, and offering recommendations for strengthening North Dakota policies).
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
State and local government officials that violate individuals’ rights may
be sued under a variety of legal actions.14 In this way, Section 1983 serves
as merely one of many causes of action available to individuals that believe
the government has violated their rights.15 A great deal has been written
about Section 1983 and its predecessor statute over the years.16 The earliest
court cases discussing issues at least somewhat related to Section 1983
claims date back to the late 1800s and early 1900s.17 In the 1960s, the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Monroe v. Pape18 led to a significant amount of scholarly research and discussion revolving around a host of
Section 1983 issues.19 This section presents the history of Section 1983,
introduces the text and relevant interpretation of Section 1983, and explains
the relationship between Section 1983 claims and the professions of law
enforcement and correctional officers.
A. HISTORY OF SECTION 1983
After the resolution of the Civil War, many public officials in Southern
state and local governments maintained Ku Klux Klan (KKK) membership.20 Intent on maintaining a system of white supremacy under girded by
government action and terror tactics, officials with KKK affiliation used
their public positions to violate the constitutional rights of African-Americans.21 To combat these illegal and dangerous tactics, Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1866,22 which criminalized violations of federally
guaranteed rights perpetrated by state and local government officials.23 In
1871, Congress added civil remedies to the statute and codified the 1866
14. See Ross, supra note 5, at 502 (discussing petitions of habeas corpus); see also Dennis E.
Hall et al., Suing Cops and Corrections Officers, 26 POLICING: AN INT’L J. OF POLICE
STRATEGIES & MGMT 529, 532, 535 (2003) (speaking of negligence in performance of duty).
15. See Randy Means, The History and Dynamics of Section 1983, POLICE CHIEF, May 1,
2004, at 6, available at www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_
arch&article_id=299&issue_id=52004 (discussing various methods of suing government
officials).
16. Hall, supra note 14, at 529.
17. See, e.g., Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430, 438-40 (1904) (discussing the need
to protect individuals’ constitutional rights against state governmental officials); Virginia v. Rives,
100 U.S. 313, 334 (1879) (stating that the government acts through the decisions of agencies and
agency officials and that such acts may potentially violate constitutional rights and liberties).
18. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
19. Hall, supra note 14, at 529-30.
20. Michael S. Vaughn & Lisa F. Coomes, Police Civil Liability Under Section 1983: When
Do Police Officers Act Under Color of Law?, 23 J. CRIM. JUST. 395, 395-96 (1995).
21. Id. at 395.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
23. Id.
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and 1871 laws as Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States Code, the “Ku
Klux Klan Act.”24 At the time Section 1983 was enacted, no controversy
ensued regarding either its necessity or application.25
B. THE TEXT AND SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1983
Generally speaking, Section 1983 prohibits government officials from
violating the constitutional rights of individuals.26 If such rights are violated by government officials, Section 1983 provides the person injured
with legal and equitable relief.27 In order to prevail in a Section 1983
claim, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant (1) acted under color of
law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of his or her constitutional or federal law
rights.28 Section 1983 is a method of remedying federal rights, and is not in
and of itself a source of substantive rights.29
1.

Acting Under Color of Law

From the time of the statute’s enactment in 1866 until 1961, a person
acted under color of law only if that person’s questionable acts were made
in accordance with the person’s lawful authority.30 Practically speaking,
this meant that an officer that engaged in misconduct was considered to be
acting outside the scope of his or her authority, thus not acting “under color
of law.”31 Since that time, however, the Supreme Court has, through a
series of four cases, modified its interpretation of what it means to “act
under color of law.”32
First, in United States v. Classic33 the Court considered whether
Louisiana election officials violated individuals’ constitutional rights by
altering and fraudulently counting ballots in a primary election for
congressman.34 The defendants argued that they were not government

24. Id.
25. Vaughn & Coomes, supra note 20, at 395-96. At least one reason that Section 1983
originally stirred little controversy was that Reconstruction efforts, of which Section 1983 was
one, fell apart, thereby leaving the Act unenforced for many decades. Lisa E. Key, Private
Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under § 1983: The Supreme Court’s Failure to
Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV . 283, 303-06 (1996).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979).
30. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941); Vaughn & Coomes, supra note 20, at
397.
31. Classic, 313 U.S. at 326; Vaughn & Coomes, supra note 20, at 397-98.
32. Vaughn & Coomes, supra note 20, at 397-98.
33. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
34. Classic, 313 U.S. at 307-08.
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officials at the time of the questionable actions; instead, they were employees of the Democratic Party.35 The Court disagreed and reasoned that the
action was taken “under color of state law” because the defendants were
given power by state law to count and certify election ballots, and then violated state law (a criminal action) by fraudulently tampering with the election ballots.36 In short, Classic unlocked the door to what was previously a
deadbolt interpretation of viewing the misconduct of public officials as
action outside the scope of authority.
Second, the Court turned the handle when it issued its ruling in Screws
v. United States.37 In that case, the Court faced the decision of whether
certain law enforcement officers violated a citizen’s Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights when the officers hit the citizen with clubs until he was
unconscious and died.38 The Court held that, in violation of criminal law,
the officers used excessive force, and that “officers who . . . perform their
official duties are included [as having taken action under color of law]
whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it.”39
In Monroe v. Pape,40 the Court kicked the door wide open with regard
to the application of the Classic and Screws extensions of the “under color
of law” standard.41 In Monroe, the Chicago police barged into Monroe’s
residence in the middle of the night without a search warrant.42 At gun
point, Monroe and his family were made to stand without clothes while
police officers searched their home for evidence relating to a two day-old
murder.43 Monroe was then detained at the police station for ten hours
without being advised of the charges or being allowed to call his attorney.44
Prior to Monroe, the Court’s “under color of law” standard extensions
applied only to criminal law violations.45 In Monroe however, the Court
held that a person that acts under color of law to deprive a person of constitutional or federal law rights may be subject to civil liability.46 The Monroe

35. Brief of Defendant and Appellees at *13-14, Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (No. 618), 1941 WL
52906.
36. Classic, 313 U.S. at 326.
37. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
38. Screws, 325 U.S. at 92-94.
39. Id. at 111.
40. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
41. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180, 191 (stating, in essence, that extending the Court’s “under
color of law” standard, as used in the criminal context to that of the civil context, is in accordance
with Congress’s intentions).
42. Id. at 169.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 184-87.
46. Id.
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Court also held that the City of Chicago could not be sued using a Section
1983 claim because it was not a “person” within the meaning of the
statute.47
And fourth, in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of
New York,48 the Court extended the reach of Section 1983 even further by
considering how the statute should be applied to a local government-defendant.49 In 1978, a group of female employees sued their employer, New
York City, alleging that an official policy requiring pregnant employees to
take unpaid leaves of absence before the employees so desired, violated
their constitutional rights.50 The Court held that while a local government
cannot be sued “for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents,”
the government may be liable when its “policy or custom” inflicts the
injury.51 Some of the reasons that the Court expanded the application of
Section 1983 were that civil rights law encourages broad remedies, congressional debates of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 did not expressly forbid
such an interpretation, and a case decided two years after enactment of the
Act suggested such inclusion.52
2.

Depriving Plaintiff of Constitutional or Federal Law Rights

Proving that a person was deprived of a constitutional or federal law
right in a Section 1983 suit is accomplished by identifying the official’s
alleged misconduct and then sufficiently showing that the alleged misconduct is a violation of a constitutional or federal law right. For instance, in
47. Id. at 190-92.
48. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
49. Monell, 436 U.S. at 662.
50. Id. at 661.
51. Id. at 694.
52. Id. at 685, 688-89. Interwoven through the review were two separate but related principles that, if left unmentioned, would constitute a less-than-thorough explanation of Section 1983
claims; first, an entirely different line of cases exists wherein the Court interpreted the meaning of
“policy or custom.” See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 119 (1988) (stating that
those with actual authority to act on behalf of the government is determined on a case by case
basis in the state courts); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (holding that
“where action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally
responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly”); City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985) (“Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can
be attributed to a municipal policymaker.”); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638
(1980) (stating that “neither history nor policy supports a construction of [Section] 1983 that
would justify [a grant of] qualified immunity . . . to the city”). And second, although Section 1983
only provides remedies for civil rights violations involving state and local government actors,
Bivens actions provide citizens with the Section 1983 equivalent of remedies for civil rights violations in the federal context. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1971).
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Blades v. Schuetzle53 an inmate-plaintiff argued that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment by failing to protect him from the attack of another inmate.54 The
plaintiff also argued that a corrections officer violated his Fourteenth
Amendment right of equal protection by making a statement the plaintiff
considered to be racially discriminatory.55
In relation to the first argument, the court held that although prison
officials may have been negligent in protecting Blades from the attack of
another inmate, the officials’ actions did not satisfy the standard of deliberate indifference required of cruel and unusual punishment arguments.56
With regard to the second argument, the court held that even though the
officer’s race-based comments were “thoroughly offensive,” without more
the comments were not an act of race discrimination.57 Therefore, although
Blade’s claims were ultimately found to be without merit, his case provides
an accurate illustration of the requisite structure needed to successfully
prove deprivation of a constitutional right.58
Section 1983 does not require the plaintiff to prove the defendant was a
government agent actually acting in his or her official capacity at the time
of the alleged violation.59 Instead, a person may be liable for civil damages
if he or she acted under color of law and deprived another person of a right
given through constitutional or federal law.60 Although Section 1983 has
the potential to rule with a heavy hand, it also has limitations.61 Perhaps its
greatest limitation is its scope—besides the two elements of the statute
(which act as narrowing agents), Section 1983 only reaches state and local
governments, as entities, when their policies or customs inflict the injury.62

53. 302 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 2002).
54. Blades, 302 F.3d at 803.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 803-04.
57. Id. at 805.
58. See id. at 803-05 (upholding the district court’s order of summary judgment because the
plaintiff could not prove the defendant’s “requisite state of mind” and the discrimination claim
was not actionable).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
60. Id.
61. See Worrall, supra note 4, at 31-32 (recognizing that Section 1983 potentially applies to
all state government officials and that an immense amount of Section 1983 litigation has arisen
since about 1970); see also Means, supra note 15, at 5-6 (recording many Section 1983 judgments
as being in the million dollar range).
62. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
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C. LAW ENFORCEMENT/CORRECTIONS AND SECTION 1983 CLAIMS
Section 1983 is currently being used to sue officers in state and local
law enforcement and correctional agencies more than any other group of
officials; similarly, no cause of action is employed as frequently as Section
1983.63 Many law enforcement officers are concerned that they will be
sued in their personal capacities for a work related decision and that their
departments will refuse to represent them.64
Some proponents of the contemporary interpretations of Section 1983
argue that the statute is vital and fulfills its intention to reduce police misconduct.65 In addition, these proponents state that Section 1983 provides a
“check” on law enforcement officers and enables the number of police
abuses to be reduced.66 Furthermore, Section 1983 serves an important role
in ensuring that the police are reminded that they are subject to the law just
like other citizens.67
On the other hand, many law enforcement and correctional officers
argue that although the purpose of Section 1983 is to deter police misconduct, Section 1983 as it now exists, goes too far.68 Some of these officers
state that their fear of being sued causes them, at times, to not act when they
otherwise would.69 In this way, Section 1983 potentially breeds inaction
and may have a type of paralyzing effect on officers.70 In turn, unwarranted
inaction thwarts justice, increases the likelihood of potential harm to the
public and officers—a type of occupational hazard, and interferes with job
performance.71
Recognizing arguments from proponents and opponents of Section
1983, scholars have conducted a number of relevant studies.72 The studies
(both quantitative and qualitative in nature) combine to serve an important
63. Worrall, supra note 4, at 28, 31-32; Means, supra note 15, at 1.
64. Vaughn, supra note 8, at 3, 6, 16-17.
65. Id. at 4.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 3.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Ross, supra note 5, at 502 (discussing civil liability in the correctional setting); see
also Sarah Eschholz, Police Sexual Violence and Rape Myths Civil Liability Under Section 1983,
29 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 389, 390-405 (2001) (researching ways in which perpetrators rationalize sexual violence of victims); Vaughn, supra note 8, at 16-23 (exploring police chiefs’ views regarding
civil liability); Robert D. Hanser, Inmate Suicide in Prisons: An Analysis of Legal Liability Under
42 USC Section 1983, 82 PRISON J. 459, 465-75 (2002) (studying the trends and legal challenges
facing correctional officers in regards to inmate suicide); Hall, supra note 14, at 529 (addressing
the attitudes and experiences of law enforcement and correctional officers that potentially face
civil liability).
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function in understanding how Section 1983 claims are being used contemporarily. The five cases most similar in subject matter centered on the following issues: (1) trends of civil liability in correctional facilities; (2) legal
liabilities in law enforcement; (3) legal liability of inmate suicides in prison;
(4) civil liability for perpetrating sexual violence; and (5) differences and
similarities of police officers’ and correctional officers’ experiences in being sued civilly.
1.

Trends of Civil Liability in Correctional Facilities

The first and most relevant study concentrated on the trends of
correctional civil liability in the United States.73 Prior to the study, a
significant amount of research existed regarding Section 1983 and its application to law enforcement across the nation, and especially in the correctional setting.74 However, a gap existed in identifying the correctional policies that posed “the greatest risk of litigation.”75 Seeing this, Professor
Ross, the project’s architect, conducted an extensive study of Section 1983
actions across the entire United States District Court system.76 The project’s focus spanned the years of 1970 to 1994.77
Ross found that during the first five years of his study, the number of
Section 1983 lawsuits filed increased by about 200% and the number of
individuals incarcerated increased by 45%.78 In addition, during the second
five years of the study, the number of Section 1983 filings increased
approximately 100% and the number of prisoners increased by almost the
same amount.79 Similar increases were found throughout the rest of the
project.80
Interestingly, 92% of the cases studied were filed without the assistance of legal counsel.81 In addition, Ross concluded that about 4% of the
prison population studied filed a Section 1983 lawsuit during the span of
the study.82
Ross also studied trends associated with the various types of lawsuits.83
In doing so, he identified sixteen categories in which inmates frequently file
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Ross, supra note 5, at 502.
Id.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 502.
Id.
Id. at 507.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 509; see 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1976) (establishing the federal pauper’s statute).
Ross, supra note 5, at 507.
Id. at 508-11.
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Section 1983 lawsuits.84 For instance, during the period of time studied,
about 4% of the cases were brought under an argument of cruel and unusual
punishment.85 Similarly, the plaintiff claimed the violation of free speech
rights in another 4% of the cases.86 And, in approximately 7% of the cases,
a failure to protect a claim was argued.87 Overall, Ross acknowledged that
the number of Section 1983 claims would continue to increase proportionately to any increase in the prison population.88 At the same time, however,
Ross speculated that legislation aimed at limiting frivolous law suits may
cause the number of Section 1983 claims to decline significantly.89
2.

General Legal Liabilities of Law Enforcement Officers

In 2001, Professor Vaughn recognized the unique status of opinions
regarding civil liability for law enforcement officers.90 Vaughn’s objective
was to provide empirical evidence as to whether police civil liability law
has in fact caused “lawsuit paranoia” and severely limited enforcement of
the law.91 Vaughn was also committed to discovering whether suing police
officers was exposing the extreme cases of police misconduct that many
people claim is commonplace in the police subculture.92
Vaughn surveyed police chiefs in Texas.93 Sixty-one percent stated
that the potential for being sued “only mildly affected or had no effect at all
on their departmental functions.”94 In addition, 92% of those surveyed
disagreed with the statement that “members of the public should not be able
to bring a civil lawsuit against the police.”95
In a similar way, only 36% of the participants reported being sued
personally, or having one of their subordinates sued, in the previous three
years.96 Of those civil suits reported, the most frequently claimed misconduct was assault and battery or excessive force; false arrest, imprisonment,

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 508.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 513.
Id.
Vaughn, supra note 8, at 3-4.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id.
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or detention; and unlawful searches or seizure.97 Most interesting was the
finding that although 86% of the police chiefs felt that “some lawsuits filed
against the police help make police more professional,” 68% of police
chiefs could not state any policy that was actually altered as a result of
actual or potential civil litigation.98
3.

Prison Suicides and Civil Liability

In 2002, Professor Hanser studied the legal liability of correctional
officers in inmate suicide cases using the framework of Section 1983.99
Previous to the study, the Court held that “deliberate indifference” toward
an inmate’s serious illness or injury was a violation of the cruel and unusual
punishment of the Eighth Amendment.100 However, the Court had not yet
ruled as to whether an officer’s alleged actions in relation to an inmate’s
suicidal tendencies were subject to the deliberate indifference standard.101
Therefore, Hanser analyzed inmate suicide cases within the various state
and lower federal courts in order to see how the issue was being handled.102
As part of the findings, Hanser concluded that a narrow interpretation
of the deliberate indifference standard existed in Section 1983 cases.103
Many times, this meant that as long as the defendant-officer acted “responsibly and professionally,” the officer was not liable under Section 1983.104
The study also considered the policies frequently at issue in various Section
1983 cases.105 For instance, in one case, the prison’s psychiatrist was sued
for, among other things, not committing an inmate to a forensic hospital.106
The psychiatrist argued that he closely applied medical standards and prison
policy criteria in choosing not to commit the inmate to the hospital.107 In
view of such considerations, Hanser recommended that corrections administrators review their mental health policies with an eye toward protecting
individuals’ constitutional rights.108
97. See id. at 7-8 (finding that, of the cases reported, the most frequently claimed misconduct
was assault and battery/excessive force 22%; false arrest/imprisonment/detention 19%, and unlawful search/seizure 10%).
98. Id. at 7, 12.
99. Hanser, supra note 72, at 459-60.
100. See id. at 460-61 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 474.
104. Id. at 475.
105. See id. at 465-66, 468 (discussing the policies at play in Carrigan v. State of Delaware,
957 F. Supp. 1376, 1376 (D. Del. 1997) and Jess v. Wagner, No. 94-7211 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
106. Id. at 467 (citing McKee v. Turner, 124 F.3d 198, 198 (6th Cir. 1997)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Civil Liability for Perpetrating Sexual Violence

A crime of increasing frequency occurs when police and correctional
officers improperly use their authority to commit sexual violence.109 A law
enforcement or correctional officer perpetrates sexual violence when he or
she uses implied public trust or legal access to engage in sexual relations.110
Police sexual violence (PSV) includes acts such as “unobtrusive viewing,
sexual harassment, kidnapping, rape, and murder.”111 Section 1983 is regularly used to hold police and correctional officers liable for perpetrating
PSV.112
In Eschholz’s 2001 study of various state and local police and correctional agencies in the United States, eighteen Section 1983/PSV cases were
categorized according to three criteria.113 The criteria included whether
each case established the color of law requirement, violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause, or violated the Eighth Amendment’s
cruel and unusual punishment’s clause.114 The project used content analysis
to determine how “rape myths” operate in the law enforcement and correctional settings.115 In doing so, Eschholz found that many lower courts have
legitimatized the PSV-plaintiff claim that a violation of “bodily integrity” is
a violation of the liberty right granted by the Fourteenth Amendment.116
In addition, and although not tested conclusively, it may be within the
Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence to consider PSV cases a
violation “when police act with improper motives to egregiously, arbitrarily, and capriciously harm citizens.”117 And lastly, in order to successfully
argue that a PSV incident violated the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and

109. See Eschholz, supra note 72, at 389-90 (researching ways in which perpetrators rationalize sexual violence of victims). See, e.g., Ksl.com, Former Police Officer May Have Used
Badge to Obtain Sexual Favors, www.ksl.com/index.php?nid=148&sid=2998888 (last visited
May 30, 2008) (reporting that a police officer admitted to threatening to cite a woman for child
neglect if the woman did not perform certain sexual favors for the officer).
110. Eschholz, supra note 72, at 389.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 390.
113. Id. at 389.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 390 (explaining the methodology of reading through various PSV cases and
categorizing the cases based on whether the perpetrator appeared to justify the PSV by telling
himself or herself: (1) “the victim asked for it,” (2) “no means yes,” (3) “s/he owes me,” (4)
“denial of injury,” (5) “no one can be raped against their will,” (6) “the victim cried rape,” (7)
“sluts/whores cannot be raped,” or (8) “women cannot rape”).
116. Id. at 400 (citing Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 628 (4th Cir. 1997); Bennett v.
Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 584 (5th Cir. 1996); Battista v. Cannon, 934 F. Supp. 400, 405 (M.D. Fla.
1996); Carney v. White, 843 F. Supp. 462, 466 (E.D. Wis. 1994)).
117. See id. (making inferences from the Court’s holding in Rogers v. City of Little Rock,
152 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1998)).
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unusual punishment clause, the Court will likely require the plaintiff to
“show that: [1] the assault violated evolving standards of decency[,]118 or
failed to provide inmates with the minimum civilized measure of life’s
necessities[;]119 and [2] was perpetrated with the culpable mental state of
deliberate indifference[,]120 or malicious and sadistic intent for the very
purpose of causing harm.”121
5.

Police Officer Liability Versus Correctional Officer Liability

In 2003, Professor Hall examined the differences and similarities of
police officers and correctional officers, particularly the attitudes and experiences of the two groups toward civil liability.122 The study focused on
whether factors such as occupation, rank, experience, and education affected officers’ attitudes toward and experiences involving civil lawsuit.123 The
study found that substantially more police officers than correctional officers
reported being sued civilly.124
Overall, Section 1983 is the most commonly used legal device to hold
officers responsible for violating individuals’ constitutional liberties.125
Police and correctional officer liability generally, and Section 1983 liability
specifically, have been studied in numerous jurisdictions and at a variety of
conceptual levels.126 After grasping a comprehensive understanding of the
Section 1983 literature, the focus of the project turns to the methodology
employed in the study.
III. DATA AND METHODS
With increasing frequency and energy, law reviews are publishing the
empirical research of legal scholars and social scientists.127 An essential
118. See Eschholz, supra note 72, at 401 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
119. See id. (citing Rhodes v. Champan, 452 U.S. 337, 363 (1981)).
120. See id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839-40 (1994)).
121. See id. (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)).
122. Hall, supra note 14, at 529.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 535 (reporting that 27% of police officers and 6% of correctional officers stated
that they had been sued).
125. Worrall, supra note 4, at 28; Means, supra note 15, at 1.
126. See Ross, supra note 5, at 507-12 (discussing trends in correctional officer civil liability
cases); see also Eschholz, supra note 72, at 389-405 (studying how perpetrators of sexual violence
justify their crimes); Vaughn, supra note 8, at 6-16 (reporting the findings of police chiefs’ views
regarding legal liabilities); Hanser, supra note 72, at 460-74 (exploring the issue of officer liability
in prison suicide cases); Hall, supra note 14, at 534-39 (providing results of officers’ attitudes and
experiences with civil liability).
127. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83
N.C. L. REV. 167, 167 (2004) (calling for, among other things, “law reviews to adopt a set of
stringent disclosure requirements designed to foster critical review and replication of empirical

432

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 84:419

element of publishing such research is an explanation of the vital characteristics of the data.128 In order to enable verification and duplication of the
researcher’s study, it is necessary to present the critical methods used to
obtain the project’s results.129
A. DATA
The main objective of the current project includes identifying the most
common legal basis of Section 1983 claims in North Dakota and the agency
policies most frequently implicated in the lawsuits. To obtain this objective, content analysis was used.130 Content analysis is a quantitative
research method of systemically analyzing and making inferences from
text.131 The study’s population included all “reported” Section 1983 cases
involving law enforcement and correctional agencies in North Dakota
between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2007.132 The unit of analysis

legal research”); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2002)
(recognizing the then-apparent non-compliance of disclosure rules of many law reviews in publishing empirical analysis and adapting rules of inference to meet the “special needs, theories, and
data [of] legal scholarship”); Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 169, 171-80 (2002) (discussing, in part, contemporary methodological advances in
empirical legal scholarship); Dennis Patterson, The Limits of Empiricism: What Facts Tell Us, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2738, 2738 (2000) (encouraging more legal academic empirical information and
stating that “empirical analysis is preferable to many scholarly alternatives now on offer in the law
review literature”); Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 812
(1999) (noting, approvingly, an increase in publication of empirical legal research amidst the
predominantly theoretical and doctrinal scholarship of most law reviews).
128. See Mitchell, supra footnote 127, at 200-01 (referencing requirements of the American
Psychological Association Publication Manual, which applies to a great deal of social science
literature, to include a section wherein the author “disclose[s] sufficient information to allow another investigator to evaluate one’s methods and verify one’s results”).
129. Id. at 200.
130. See RUSSELL K. SCHUTT, INVESTIGATING THE SOCIAL WORLD 428-29 (5th ed. 2006)
(explaining that content analysis is a useful method of conducting research when the material to be
studied is in text format). After reading through the text, the relevant material is categorized or
coded based on variation and/or relationships among constructs in the text. Id. The coding produces numerical data based on observations of certain phenomena pre-determined by the
researcher. Id. The numerical data aids the researcher in making inferences regarding the subject
in question. Id. The method by which the current project was coded and analyzed is detailed in
Section III.B. See discussion supra Section III.B (stating, in part, that the Section 1983 cases were
officially reported between January 1997 and December 2007 by the District Court of North
Dakota, and each such case was studied independently of the others).
131. Id.
132. In this study, “reported” means that the Section 1983 case was adjudicated by the
United States District Court of North Dakota and published either in an official judicial reporter
(e.g., F. Supp. 2d), and/or through the Westlaw and LexisNexis databases. A potential weakness in
limiting the scope of the project in this way was that cases that were settled, dismissed, or otherwise disposed of without being reported were not captured. However, obtaining Section 1983
cases that were settled or otherwise disposed of without being reported is probably impracticable
for this particular project given the existing cost and time limitations.
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included forty-five Section 1983 cases reported by the District of North
Dakota.
B. METHODS
The scope of the project was narrowed by defining the time period to
cases officially reported between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2007.
A search of all the Section 1983 cases in the United States Eighth Circuit
court system (which includes the District of North Dakota) was conducted.133 The search produced seventy-nine cases. The cases were manually and individually reviewed word by word to ensure that each case was
actually: (1) a District of North Dakota case; (2) a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
case; 134 and (3) only included once in the population.135 After performing
this verification process, forty-five cases fit the qualifications of the population. Because forty-five cases is a reasonable number to review individually, the entire population was studied; sampling was not utilized. In
applying content analysis to each case, the data obtained was recorded into
an electronic Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) file.136
133. In order to complete the research, the Westlaw database was used to search for reported
cases of Section 1983 claims. The following search terms were employed: “42 U.S.C. Section
1983”, “North Dakota”, and “police” or “sheriff” or “highway patrol.” All terms inside quotations
were marked as “required”; this means that the terms must be present within the structure of each
case at least one time in order for the case to be considered. The “Terms and Connectors” search
function, rather than “Natural Language” function, was utilized because it allowed for the “ordering” of alternative wording. By ordering the search, Westlaw was directed to search for cases that
contained the terms “police” or “sheriff” or “highway patrol”, but only required that one of the
three terms actually be present in the case.
134. In word searches, the Westlaw software program often selects unrelated cases when
numbers (i.e., the year “1983’) and terms used for multiple purposes (i.e., “42 U.S.C.”) are used.
Therefore, the best way to protect against this glitch is to individually and manually verify each
case before including it in the population.
135. Ensuring that the case was only counted once is important because occasionally the
Westlaw search included the district court case, as well as the appellate case in a higher court. As
a matter of methodical disclosure, when such instances occurred in this project, the district court
case was used. The reasoning for doing so was that at the district court all of the plaintiff’s claims
are considered, whereas a case in a higher court may only consider those claims on appeal. Since
this project valued learning from all of the plaintiff’s claims, the district court case was used.
136. The coding was as follows: (1) year in which the incident giving rise to the case
occurred (values: 1985 to 2007, NA); (2) year in which the case was reported (values: 1997 to
2007, NA); (3) name of defendant-law enforcement agency; (4) gender of plaintiff (values: Male,
Female, NA); (5) status of plaintiff (values: Inmate, Subject of a police investigation, Agency
employee, Other, NA); (6) total number of constitutional amendments upon which the case was
alleged to be grounded (values: 0-6, NA); (7) constitutional amendment(s) cited by plaintiff
(values: 0, Amendments 1 to 27, other, NA); (8) total number of constitutional provisions upon
which arguments were alleged to be grounded (values: 0-6, NA); (9) constitutional provision(s)
cited by plaintiff (values: Free speech, Unreasonable search or seizure, Warrant violation, Doublejeopardy, Assistance of counsel, Excessive bail, Cruel and unusual punishment, Due process,
Deliberate indifference, Equal protection, Other, NA, NAP); (10) whether plaintiff was pro se
(values: Yes, No, NA); (11) total number of agency policies implicated in plaintiff’s complaint
(values: 0-6, NA); and (12) agency policies implicated in plaintiff’s complaint (values: Medical
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IV. RESULTS
The results of the project can be categorized into five main areas. The
areas consist of agencies involved, common characteristics of plaintiffs, and
number of cases reported. The legal authority and arguments used by plaintiffs, as well as the agency policies implicated are also included.
A. AGENCIES INVOLVED
Of the ninety-six state and local enforcement agencies studied, Section
1983 claims were filed against officers of eighteen different agencies during
January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2007.137 Employees of the North
Dakota Department of Corrections were sued more than any other employees, being named in 44.4% of all reported cases.138 Even though the cities
of Fargo and Bismarck have more residents than Grand Forks, the Grand
Forks Police Department was named in more Section 1983 cases than both
Fargo and Bismarck combined.139 In addition, employees of police
departments in North Dakota were sued slightly more than those of sheriff’s
offices.140

care, Access to courts, Discipline and grievance procedures, Administrative liability, Conditions
of confinement, Duty to protect, Use of force, Classification, Religious practice, Illegal search or
seizure, Administrative segregation, Cruel and Unusual Punishments, Mail, Visitation, Mental
health, Facilities, Unlawful detention or arrest, Unlawful stop, Employment policy, Access to
attorney, Race discrimination, Other available, NA, NAP). See infra Appendix A (listing the
North Dakota Law Enforcement and Corrections Agencies).
137. The agencies sued, as well as the corresponding valid percentile of which each agency
sued, is as follows: Barnes County Sheriff 2.22%; Bottineau County Sheriff 2.22%; Burleigh
County Sheriff 2.22%; Cass County Sheriff 2.22%; Dickinson County Sheriff 2.22%; Fargo
Police 6.67%; Grafton Police 2.22%; Grand Forks Police 13.33%; Grand Forks County Sheriff
2.22%; Griggs County Sheriff 2.22%; Jamestown Police 2.22%; Mountrail County Sheriff 2.22%;
North Dakota Department of Corrections 44.44%; Rolette County Sheriff 2.22%; Stark County
Sheriff 2.22%; Ward County Sheriff 2.22%; Williams County Sheriff 2.22%; and Williston Police
2.22%.
138. Of the forty-five Section 1983 cases reported between January 1, 1997 and December
31, 2007, the North Dakota Department of Corrections was sued twenty times, or in 44.44% of the
cases.
139. See United States Census Bureau, State and County Quickfacts, 1, http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/38/3807200.html (last visited May 30, 2008) (stating that according to the
2003 U.S. Census data estimate, Bismarck had 56,344 residents, Fargo maintained 91,484 residents, and 48,618 people lived in Grand Forks). In the current study, neither Bismarck Police nor
Burleigh County Sheriff was named in any reported Section 1983 actions. Fargo Police, on the
other hand, was sued in about 7% of all cases studied, and Grand Forks Police was sued in 15% of
all cases. Possible reasons that Fargo Police and Grand Forks Police, with their smaller populations, were named in more claims than Bismarck Police and Burleigh County Sheriff is not conclusively known at this time; in addition, speculation on this point is beyond the scope of the
project.
140. Police departments were named as defendants in 29% of all reported Section 1983
cases, as compared to sheriff’s offices that were implicated in 27% of cases.
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B. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF PLAINTIFFS
An overwhelming majority of Section 1983 plaintiffs in North Dakota
were men. Only two of the forty-five cases studied were filed by women.141
Of the twenty North Dakota Department of Corrections (ND DOCR) cases
studied, 100% were filed by men. In other words, although the Department
of Corrections does in fact house female inmates, there were no reported
Section 1983 cases that were filed by female inmates.
As shown in Figure 1, the plaintiff in each case was categorized as
being an inmate, a subject in a police investigation, or an agency employee;
the categories were mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Interestingly,
plaintiffs were subjects of a police investigation in about 26% of the cases
studied. In addition, subjects of police investigations sued officers from
only seven North Dakota law enforcement agencies.142 Of all the plaintiffs
studied, approximately 9% were agency employees.143

141. Males were plaintiffs in about 96% of all reported cases, whereas females were named
in 4% of cases. Interestingly, the female plaintiffs both sued the Grand Forks Police Department.
142. Subjects of investigation filed Section 1983 claims against officers from the following
law enforcement agencies: Grand Forks Police (four times), Bottineau County Sheriff, Mountrail
County Sheriff, Stark County Sheriff, Dickinson Police, Jamestown Police, and Fargo Police
(twice).
143. Employees of the following agencies sued their supervisors: Grafton Police, Barnes
County Sheriff, Grand Forks Police, and Griggs County Sheriff.

436

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 84:419

Figure 1
STATUS OF PLAINTIFF
STATUS

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE (%)

Inmate

29

64.44

Subject of Investigation

12

26.67

Agency Employee

4

8.89

Total

45

100.00

Remarkably, 64% of the cases were filed by inmates. Of these inmateplaintiffs, about 44% claimed Section 1983 violations against employees of
the ND DOCR. The remaining inmate-plaintiffs filed suits against correctional officers employed by county jails.144 About 93% of the inmate-plaintiffs filed claims without the assistance of legal counsel. Overall, 64% of
the cases studied were filed by pro se plaintiffs.145
C. NUMBER OF CASES REPORTED
An average of 2.2 cases was reported each year from 1997 to 2006.146
Significantly though, in 2007, twenty-three cases were reported by the
court. Of these, eleven of the incidents underlying the lawsuits actually
occurred in 2007; the remaining incidents took place in previous years.
One of the first possible reasons for such an explosion of reported cases in
2007 could be a large increase in prisoner population. As Figure 2 shows,
the prisoner population in North Dakota increased throughout the entire
span of the study, with an aggregate increase of about 74%. However, the
large number of Section 1983 cases in 2007 cannot be explained solely by
an increase in prisoner population because the smallest increase in prisoner
population (about 1%) actually occurred in the same year as the significant
increase of cases. Instead, some factor outside the scope of this study
almost certainly was the primary contributor for the large increase in cases
reported in 2007.147

144. The defendant-officers were employed by sheriff’s offices in the following counties:
Bottineau, Mountrail (twice), Williams, Rolette, Barnes, Ward, Stark, Griggs, and Cass.
145. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1258 (8th ed. 2004) (defining pro se plaintiffs as those
that represent themselves “in a court proceeding without the assistance of a lawyer”).
146. The total number of cases reviewed for the first time from 1997 to 2006 was twentytwo.
147. Given that the 2007 data represents the most recent and available information, the study
is not able to determine whether the factor represents a unique occurrence or signals a
fundamental change in the nature of the North Dakota prison population.
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Figure 2
ND DOCR
AVERAGE INMATE POPULATION
Calendar
Year

Average Number of
State Prisoner
Population

Increase in Prisoner
Population (%)

1997

819

15.80

1998

902

10.13

1999

931

3.22

2000

1016

9.13

2001

1099

8.17

2002

1160

5.55

2003

1198

3.28

2004

1299

8.43

2005

1373

5.70

2006

1409

2.62

2007

1429

1.42

D. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENTS EMPLOYED BY PLAINTIFFS
Importantly, the study considered the constitutional authority and
accompanying arguments employed by each of the forty-five Section 1983
plaintiffs. Although the entire findings are shown in Figure 3, the most
notable include the fact that a Fourteenth Amendment violation was alleged
in 42% of the cases. The Eighth Amendment was cited 35% of the time. In
addition, the plaintiff made the fatal error of not making any constitutional
connection to his Section 1983 claim in 5% of the cases; all of these cases
were initiated by pro se inmate-plaintiffs.148

148. Worthy of note is the fact that the “legal authority” categories were not considered
mutually exclusive, although they were exhaustive. Meaning, if a plaintiff cited the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the plaintiff was recorded as having implicated both authorities. As
shown in Figure 3, there were seventy-six constitutional amendments cited to in forty-five cases.
In addition, although the scope of the study was open to all amendments cited by plaintiffs, only
those amendments actually cited at least once are listed in Figure 3.

438

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 84:419

Figure 3
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS CITED BY
NORTH DAKOTA SECTION 1983 PLAINTIFFS
AMENDMENT

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE
(%)

I

12

15.79

IV

8

10.53

VI

4

5.26

VIII

16

21.05

XIV

32

42.11

None

4

5.26

TOTAL

76

100.00

In considering the actual arguments and constitutional clauses used, the
study found that plaintiffs alleged some type of due process violation in
almost 32% of the cases. Deliberate indifference was argued in approximately 19% of cases. The other legal arguments employed by Section 1983
plaintiffs are detailed in Figure 4.149
In 52% of the cases, the plaintiff cited more than one constitutional
amendment violation. But, in only 13% of the cases did the plaintiff assert
more than two constitutional violation claims. In almost 57% of all cases,
the plaintiff employed more than one argument to support his constitutional
violation claim(s). In about 23% of the cases, more than two arguments
were used to support the claim(s). Five arguments were the most any
plaintiff ever used to support his claim(s).

149. Similar to the structure of the legal authority categories, the categories of constitutional
provisions were not considered mutually exclusive. This means that if a plaintiff employed a free
speech argument, as well as a due process argument, the plaintiff was recorded as having used
both arguments. As such, there were eighty-five constitutional provisions or arguments made in
forty-five Section 1983 cases. In addition to those legal arguments listed in Figure 4, the study
looked for plaintiffs to cite double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and excessive bail arguments.
Because these three arguments were not employed at least once in the population of cases, they
are not listed in Figure 4.
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Figure 4

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION EMPLOYED BY
NORTH DAKOTA SECTION 1983 PLAINTIFFS
PROVISION/
ARGUMENT

E.

NUMBER
OF
INSTANCES

PERCENTAGE
(%)

Free Speech

7

8.24

Unreasonable
Search/Seizure

5

5.88

Warrant Violation

2

2.35

Assist. Of Counsel

2

2.35

Cruel & Usual
Punishment

3

3.53

Due Process

27

31.77

Deliberate Indifference

16

18.82

Equal Protection

8

9.41

Other

11

12.94

None

4

4.71

TOTAL

85

100.00

POLICIES IMPLICATED

In the most substantively rich portion of the findings, the agency policies implicated in each case of the population were studied. Figure 5 provides the statistical details of the findings, but of particular note is the
finding that the policy most frequently cited was that of providing medical
care to incarcerated persons. In addition, the discipline and grievance procedures of agencies were frequently implicated. Likewise, plaintiffs were
especially concerned with North Dakota agencies’ use of force policies.
With specific regard to correctional agencies, plaintiffs commonly filed
Section 1983 claims questioning agencies’ administrative segregation and
mail privileges policies.
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Figure 5
NORTH DAKOTA LAW ENFORCEMENT & CORRECTIONS
AGENCY POLICIES IMPLICATED IN SECTION 1983 CLAIMS
Number of
Policies
Implicated

Percentage
(%)

ND
DOCR
Cases

ND
Sheriff
Office
Cases

ND Police
Department
Cases

Medical Care

9

10.58

8

1

0

Discipline/Grievience
Proceedings

7

8.24

7

0

0

Duty to Protect

5

5.88

3

1

1

Unlawful Search &
Seizure

5

5.88

2

2

1

Mail
Administrative
Segregation
Unlawful
Detainment/Arrest

5

5.88

4

1

0

5

5.88

5

0

0

4

4.71

0

2

2

Employment Policy

4

4.71

0

2

2

Conditions of
Confinement

4

4.71

3

0

1

Access to Courts

3

3.53

1

2

0

Mental Health

3

3.53

1

2

0

Use of Force

3

3.53

1

0

2

Religious Practice

2

2.35

2

0

0

Access to Attorney

2

2.35

0

2

0

Race Discrimination

2

2.35

1

1

0

Cruel & Unusual
Punishment

1

1.18

1

0

0

Visitation

1

1.18

0

1

0

Administrative
Liability

1

1.18

1

0

0

Other Available

19

22.35

7

5

7

Not Available

0

0

0

0

0

100.00

47
(55.29)

22 (25.88)

16 (18.82)

Total

85
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We can draw several preliminary conclusions from the data presented.
The majority of Section 1983 claims in North Dakota are filed by inmateplaintiffs. Although there are ninety-six state and local law enforcement/
correctional agencies in North Dakota, only eighteen were named in Section
1983 lawsuits over the last eleven years. The number of reported Section
1983 lawsuits against North Dakota law enforcement and corrections agencies dramatically increased in 2007. The most commonly cited constitutional claims were Fourteenth Amendment due process and Eighth
Amendment cruel and unusual punishment violations. The arguments most
frequently used to support the plaintiffs’ claims included due process, deliberate indifference, and equal protection arguments. The group of policies
implicated most commonly involved medical care for inmates. Agency
policies governing discipline and grievances procedures, including those
intended for both inmates and agency employees, were also frequently
questioned.
V. DISCUSSION
The significance of the results of the project is best understood when
properly placed in the context of three issues. First, is Section 1983 overly
burdensome on law enforcement and correctional agencies in North
Dakota? Second, how do North Dakota’s Section 1983 statistical trends
compare to those of other jurisdictions? And third, what can North Dakota
agencies do to improve and strengthen their administrative policies?
A. IS SECTION 1983 BURDENSOME TO NORTH DAKOTA AGENCIES?
The first issue to consider is the extent to which Section 1983 burdens
North Dakota agencies. In 1995, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) to reduce the high number of frivolous and meritless
lawsuits filed by prisoners, of which Section 1983 may be included.150 In
examining other jurisdictions, Ross’s study noted dramatic increases in
Section 1983 lawsuits (sometimes as much as doubling previous increases)
and correlated a significant portion of the increase to the ever-ballooning
number of federal prisoners.151 Such dramatic increases in a relatively short
period of time represent at least one way that Section 1983 claims burden

150. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1996); Pipes v. North Dakota, No. 1:07-CV-00067, 2007 WL
4661655, *1 (D.N.D. Dec. 10, 2007)
151. Ross, supra note 5, at 507.
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some law enforcement and correctional agencies across the United
States.152
In North Dakota, the number of reported Section 1983 lawsuits
remained relatively constant from 1997 to 2006, with an average of 2.2
reported cases per year.153 In 2007 however, the number sky-rocketed to
twenty-two reported cases in one year.154 North Dakota’s Section 1983
caseload from 1997 to 2006 appears to be quite modest compared to the
overall load experienced in Ross’s study of all federal judicial districts.155
However, the number of Section 1983 cases reported in 2007 increased
more than 900% over the average number of cases reported in the previous
ten years. This significant increase is important evidence that the Section
1983 caseload may be a heavy burden on law enforcement and correctional
agencies in North Dakota.
Evaluating the burden of Section 1983 cases in North Dakota can also
occur by determining the number of reported cases filed by pro se plaintiffs.
In Ross’s study, about 90% of the Section 1983 claims were filed by pro se
plaintiffs.156 In North Dakota, about two-thirds of the plaintiffs filed
without the assistance of counsel.
In the Eighth Circuit, of which North Dakota is part, courts must
liberally construe complaints filed by pro se inmates and must ascertain
whether the complaint may provide relief “on any possible theory.”157 This,
in essence, amounts “to a less stringent standard than what would be
required of attorneys.”158 On a practical level, the mandate significantly
increases the amount of time the court must spend in reviewing and
deciphering what many times are ill-pled motions of pro se plaintiffs.159
Therefore, the strain inherent in pro se filings in North Dakota is

152. See Vaughn, supra note 8, at 3 (concurring that some law enforcement officers report
they are burdened by various forms of civil liability).
153. This statistic stands true even though the average inmate population in North Dakota
increased by about 72% over the same time period.
154. Twenty-two Section 1983 cases were reported from 1997 to 2006, as compared to
twenty-three cases reported in 2007 alone.
155. See Ross, supra note 5, at 507-09.
156. Id. at 509.
157. Haley v. Dormire, 845 F.2d 1488, 1490 (8th Cir. 1988); Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d
714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974).
158. Pipes v. North Dakota, No. 1:07-CV-00067, 2007 WL 4661655, *2 (D.N.D. Dec. 10,
2007) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007)).
159. See, e.g., id. at *1 (“The complaint filed by Pipes is approximately forty pages in length
and contains several narratives in which Pipes attempts to describe his claims. The lack of
reference to any particular federal constitutional or statutory right, however, makes it difficult to
discern exactly what his claims are.”).
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noteworthy (64% of plaintiffs filed pro se), but comparatively speaking, are
not as heavy as the burden placed on federal courts at large.160
B. HOW DO THE SECTION 1983 STATISTICAL TRENDS OF NORTH
DAKOTA COMPARE?
In order for law enforcement and correctional agencies in North Dakota
to more fully familiarize themselves with Section 1983 claims and to accurately situate themselves among other Section 1983 jurisdictions, this study
discusses statistical data related to Section 1983 cases. The data can be
categorized in three ways. First, in Hall’s study of various jurisdictions,
substantially more law enforcement officers were sued than correctional
officers.161 In North Dakota, the exact opposite phenomenon exists—
correctional officers were sued more than law enforcement officers.162
Second, in Vaughn’s study of police chiefs in Texas, about one-fourth
of the cases maintained allegations of excessive use of force violations.163
Officers in North Dakota agencies fared considerably better in that only
about 7% of the cases alleged excessive use of force violations. Similarly,
police chiefs in Texas reported that claims of false arrest/imprisonment/
detention accounted for 19% of the civil lawsuits.164 In North Dakota, the
same alleged violations existed in only half as many cases. In addition, the
percentage of unlawful search or seizure allegations in North Dakota cases
was about the same (11%) as the unlawful search or seizure allegations in
Texas (10%).165
Third, some of the agency policies implicated in Ross’s study of all
federal judicial circuits are the same as those implicated in the North
Dakota cases.166 Several statistical and substantive tools exist for determining similarity and difference between two groups of data.167 One tool,
the “t-test,” examines the statistical difference between means, or averages,

160. See Ross, supra note 5, at 509 (reporting that 92% of the Section 1983 claims were filed
by plaintiffs not represented by counsel).
161. Hall, supra note 14, at 535.
162. In the present study, inmates sued corrections officials in 29 of 45 cases. In the
remaining sixteen cases, law enforcement officials were sued by subjects of investigation (12 of
45), and agency employees (4 of 45).
163. Vaughn, supra note 8, at 8.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Ross, supra note 5, at 510 (showing, for example, that medical care policies were
implicated 362 times, which is equivalent to 11% of the filings); see also supra Figure 5
(illustrating that medical care policies were implicated in about 11% of the North Dakota cases).
167. EVAN M. BERMAN, ESSENTIAL STATISTICS FOR PUBLIC MANAGER AND POLICY
ANALYSTS 180 (2d ed. 2007).
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of two variables.168 Translated into layman’s terms, the average number of
cases that implicate medical care policies in the North Dakota study were
compared against the average number of cases that implicate medical care
policies in the Ross study. If the comparison was within a statistically
approved range of acceptance, the relationship between the two variables
was deemed “significant.”169
Here, the North Dakota project found that in almost all policies there
was no statistical relationship between the two studies’ findings (see
Appendix C).170 However, two other factors suggest that similarity between the two studies does exist.171 First, the studies are similar in that they
both reported an increase in the average prisoner population over the span
of their respective time periods.172 In addition, the cases in both studies
employed the same constitutional amendments and provisions (see Figures
3 and 4).173

168. Id. at 180-81.
169. See id. at 4-6, 162-68 (discussing various techniques for testing similarity and difference between two groups of data).
170. The null hypothesis is that there is no statistical relationship between the North Dakota
policies implicated in Section 1983 claims and those policies implicated in other American jurisdictions. The null hypothesis was tested at a confidence level of 95%. Appendix C provides the
numerical data used to calculate the t-test. For example, with regard to the policy of medical care
to inmates, the test value is 1.443. Because 1.443 is not greater than the critical value of 1.96, the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Similarly, the test value for disciplinary and grievance policies
(1.328) is less than the critical value (1.96), so the null cannot be rejected. Practically speaking,
this means that according to the t-test difference of means, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
there is not a relationship between the policies implicated in Section 1983 claims in North Dakota
and policies implicated in Section 1983 claims in other jurisdictions. One possible explanation for
the results of the low t-test is that the numbers of cases in which various agency policies in North
Dakota are implicated are not sufficiently adequate to receive a higher test value. For instance, as
shown in Appendix C, most of the cells in the North Dakota study contain numbers such as three,
five, and seven. In this case, low values in the cells likely contribute to a smaller t-test value. In
addition, the current study includes more information than Ross provided with regard to all of the
policies implicated in any given case. This means that although Ross studied considerably more
cases than the present project, Ross analyzed the case based exclusively on what he considered to
be the primary argument of the case. Email from Darrel L. Ross, Department of Law Enforcement & Justice Administration Chair, Western Illinois University, to Jared W. Rigby, Author
(Mar. 21, 2008, 13:03:16 CDT) (on file with author). In the present study, all policies and arguments reported by the court were included in the analysis. Therefore, a t-test involving Ross’s
study which only included one of the potentially several policies may have influenced a slightly
lower value than would have otherwise existed.
171. Compare Ross, supra note 5, at 508 (discussing the inmate level in the federal system)
with supra Figure 2 (reporting on the North Dakota inmate level); compare also Ross, supra note
5, at 507 (discussing the number of constitutional amendments cited in most jurisdictions) with
supra Figure 2 (reporting the constitutional amendments cited in North Dakota cases).
172. Compare Ross, supra note 5, at 508 (illustrating that, with the exception of one year, the
number of inmates in the federal prison system increased from 1970 to 1994) with supra Figure 2
(showing that the number of inmates at the ND DOCR increased from 1997 to 2007).
173. Compare Ross, supra note 5, at 507 (stating, for example, that inmates in most jurisdictions commonly employ more than one constitutional amendment in Section 1983 cases) with
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Overall, the statistical data discussed above enables North Dakota
agencies and officers to identify their Section 1983 situation relative to their
counterparts in other states. In events such as an increase in prisoner
population, the employment of constitutional amendments and provisions,
and an increase in Section 1983 cases, North Dakota appears to be similar
to most jurisdictions. However, in terms of the policies implicated, North
Dakota may exhibit a statistically different experience than most other
jurisdictions.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING NORTH DAKOTA
POLICIES
Drawing upon the findings of the current study, three recommendations
exist for North Dakota law enforcement and correctional agencies. First,
agencies should review and update their existing policies. Second, individual agencies or the state should conduct a study that focuses on the decisions and behavior of those that perpetuate the policy violations.174 Third,
agencies should provide regular training and educational opportunities
wherein employees learn about issues regarding agency and personal
liability.175
1.

Review and Update Policies

The first step North Dakota law enforcement and correctional agencies
should take is to review and update their respective policies with an eye
toward further protecting individuals’ constitutional rights and liberties.176
This recommendation is not given with the assumption that the policy, as
opposed to some other factor such as improper action taken by officers, was
the sole and direct cause of the Section 1983 claim. Rather, in recommending policy reviews, this study merely intends to rule out or improve agency
policy before tackling more complicated issues such as officer training.
Generally speaking, agencies ought to begin their review with medical care
and disciplinary/grievance procedures because these policies were implicated in Section 1983 cases most often. After this is accomplished, agencies might consider focusing their attention on policies that govern duty to

supra Part IV.D (reporting, for example, that plaintiffs in North Dakota cited more than one
constitutional amendment violation in 52% of the cases).
174. See Ross, supra note 5, at 513 (agreeing that “[a] systematic review and development of
policies and procedures is necessary to keep personnel performing their job duties commensurate
with the law”).
175. See id. (recognizing that new officers typically receive adequate training to start their
positions, but that regular in-service training “frequently suffers”).
176. See id. (concurring in the need to protect individuals’ constitutional rights).
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protect, search and seizure, and where applicable, their administrative
segregation, and inmate mail issues.
2.

Study Those That Actually Violate Section 1983

Second, under conditions that are feasible to North Dakota agencies,
further studies of Section 1983 claims should be conducted.177 Whereas the
current study focused on the individuals that initiated the Section 1983
claims (the plaintiffs), additional agency-led studies ought to concentrate on
characteristics that are similar among those that actually violate the agency
policies (the defendant-officers). By doing this, agency administrators will
increase their understanding of the environment, circumstances, and rationales of defendant-officers’ actions and behavior.178 In turn, an understanding from the perspective of the errant officers will assist administrators in
reducing agency liability and responding through training tailored to the
needs of individual agencies.179
3.

Regularly Train and Educate Employees

The third recommendation is that agencies consider establishing a
regular training time each month wherein specific policies are presented and
discussed.180 An important element to training officers in Section 1983
issues is to include an education component in the training. When accomplished properly, the education component will focus on obtaining a broad
perspective of the Section 1983 issue, whereas traditional training often
consists of essentially listing the “dos” and “don’ts” associated with avoiding agency and personal liability. The first objective of an education component in the Section 1983 context is to show employees why certain
speech and conduct are not legal and appropriate. Applied to officers, for
instance, this may mean that referring to people of color using derogatory
terms may lead to or be per se evidence of treating others unequally.181
The second objective is to convince the trainees that language and
behavior should conform to the principles communicated in the training
portion because it is in their best personal interest to treat others fairly,
177. See id. at 513-14 (calling for correctional agencies to examine their individual systems).
178. See Eschholz, supra note 72, at 401 (agreeing that a study of the circumstances underlying agency and officer liability ought to be conducted).
179. See Vaughn, supra note 8, at 22-23 (concurring that Section 1983 experiences differ
across jurisdictions and that the needs of various jurisdictions, including training, may also vary
depending on the jurisdiction).
180. See id. at 23 (agreeing that regular and meaningful training reduces liability).
181. See id. (concurring that officers that speak as though they do not treat people fairly and
equally should be carefully observed by supervisors because those officers likely do treat individuals unfairly and unequally).
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equally, and with care.182 To officers, this may mean that policy violations
lead to disciplinary action, whereas favorable reviews offered by clients, coworkers, and supervisors lead to organizational rewards. In addition, on a
personal level, Section 1983 allegations may lead to some taint or loss of
favorable reputation for officers named in Section 1983 actions.
In short, North Dakota law enforcement and correctional agencies
ought to strengthen their policies by conducting reviews and updates with
the intention of protecting individuals’ constitutional rights and liberties. In
addition, agencies should, where feasible, study Section 1983 cases by concentrating on characteristics that are similar among those that actually
violate the agency policies. Furthermore, agencies need to establish regular
training wherein agency policies are discussed and employees are educated
as to how compliance with policy benefits others and themselves.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Section 1983 cases in North Dakota and the majority of other
jurisdictions intersect and diverge depending on the particular issue considered. In this study of the most recent eleven years, the constitutional
amendments and provisions employed in reported North Dakota cases are
similar to those used in other jurisdictions throughout the United States. In
addition, the agency policies implicated in North Dakota cases are, in
several ways, similar to those challenged in other jurisdictions.
Furthermore, like most other jurisdictions, the inmate population in
North Dakota increased over the span of the study. And, a large number of
inmate-plaintiffs in both studies filed without the assistance of counsel.
Unlike some jurisdictions, however, plaintiffs of reported Section 1983
cases in North Dakota more frequently sued correctional officers than law
enforcement officers. Additionally, the plaintiffs are most frequently inmates incarcerated with the North Dakota Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation or one of the jails in North Dakota.
Generally speaking, the present project found that from 1997 to 2007
the agency policies most commonly implicated in Section 1983 cases in
North Dakota included those dealing with medical care to inmates and
disciplinary and grievance procedures for inmates and employees. North
Dakota agencies and plaintiffs alike will be better served as the aforementioned agency policies are reevaluated and, where applicable, updated.
Either the state or individual agencies should consider conducting studies
wherein the characteristics common to those that actually violate their

182. See id. at 23 (agreeing that treating citizens fairly reduces lawsuits).
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policies are examined. Regular training that incorporates an education
component will more likely convince officers to tailor their communication,
actions, and decisions to constitutional mandates.
Overall, this study is important because it identifies Section 1983
issues that North Dakota law enforcement and correctional agencies and
officers have recently been accused of violating. The study also provides
agencies with data and recommendations that will enable agencies and
officers to avoid Section 1983 violations. Most importantly, the data and
recommendations will allow agencies and officers to conduct their essential
missions of public service while protecting individuals’ fundamental
constitutional rights and liberties.
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APPENDIX A
NORTH DAKOTA LAW ENFORCEMENT &
CORRECTIONS AGENCIES

North Dakota Department of
Corrections
North Dakota Highway Patrol
Adams County Sheriff’s Office
Barnes County Sheriff’s Office
Valley City Police Department
Benson County Sheriff’s Office
Billings County Sheriff’s Office
Bottineau County Sheriff’s Office
Bowman County Sheriff’s Office
Bowman Police Department
Burke County Sheriff’s Office
Burleigh County Sheriff’s Office
Bismarck Police Department
Lincoln Police Department
Cass County Sheriff’s Office
Fargo Police Department
West Fargo Police Department
Cavalier County Sheriff’s Office
Dickey County Sheriff’s Office
Oakes Police Department
Divide County Sheriff’s Office
Crosby Police Department
Dunn County Sheriff’s Office
Eddy County Sheriff’s Office
Emmons County Sheriff’s Office
Linton Police Department
Foster County Sheriff’s Office
Carrington Police Department
Golden Valley County Sheriff’s
Office
Grand Forks County Sheriff’s
Office
Emerado Police Department
Grand Forks Police Department
Larimore Police Department
Northwood Police Department
Thompson Police Department
Grant County Sheriff’s Office
Griggs County Sheriff’s Office
Hettinger County Sheriff’s Office
Kidder County Sheriff’s Office
Steele Police Department
LaMoure County Sheriff’s Office

Logan County Sheriff’s Office
Napoleon Police Department
McHenry County Sheriff’s Office
McIntosh County Sheriff’s Office
Wishek Police Department
McKenzie County Sheriff’s Office
Watford City Police Department
McLean County Sheriff’s Office
Mercer County Sheriff’s Office
Beulah Police Department
Hazen Police Department
Morton County Sheriff’s Office
Mandan Police Department
Mountrail County Sheriff’s Office
Nelson County Sheriff’s Office
Oliver County Sheriff’s Office
Pembina County Sheriff’s Office
Cavalier Police Department
Pierce County Sheriff’s Office
Rugby Police Department
Ramsey County Sheriff’s Office
Devils Lake Police Department
Ransom County Sheriff’s Office
Lisbon Police Department
Renville County Sheriff’s Office
Richland County Sheriff’s Office
Wahpeton Police Department
Rolette County Sheriff’s Office
Rolla Police Department
Sergeant County Sheriff’s Office
Sheridan County Sheriff’s Office
Sioux County Sheriff’s Office
Slope County Sheriff’s Office
Stark County Sheriff’s Office
Dickinson Police Department
Steele County Sheriff’s Office
Stutsman County Sheriff’s Office
Jamestown Police Department
Towner County Sheriff’s Office
Traill County Sheriff’s Office
Mayville Police Department
Portland Police Department
Hillsboro Police Department
Walsh County Sheriff’s Office
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Grafton Police Department
Ward County Sheriff’s Office
Minot Police Department
Wells County Sheriff’s Office
Harvey Police Department
Fessenden Police Department
Williams County Sheriff’s Office
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Williston Police Department
NDSCS Police Department
NDSU Police Department
UND Police Department
Other
NA
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF POPULATION (OF CASES)
1. Poolman v. City of Grafton, N.D., 487 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2007).
2. Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2005).
3. Blades v. Schuetzle, 302 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 2002).
4. Burke v. North Dakota Dept. of Corrs. and Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043 (8th Cir. 2002).
5. Hulse v. Hall, 205 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1999).
6. Pipes v. North Dakota, No. 1:07-CV-00067, 2007 WL 4661655
(D.N.D. Dec. 10, 2007). (Against Bottineau County Sheriff).
7. Pipes v. North Dakota, No. 1:07-CV-00067, 2007 WL 4661655
(D.N.D. Dec. 10, 2007). (Against North Dakota Department of Corrections).
8. Steinbach v. Branson, No. 1:05-CV-101, 2007 WL 2985571 (D.N.D. Oct. 9, 2007).
9. Johnson v. Welte, No. CIV. 3:06-CV-89, 2007 WL 2790666 (D.N.D. Sept. 24,
2007). (Against Grand Forks City Police, before incarceration).
10. Johnson v. Welte, No. CIV. 3:06-CV-89, 2007 WL 2790666
(D.N.D. Sept. 24, 2007). (Against Grand Forks City Police, during incarceration).
11. Moore v. Bertsch, No. 105-CV-098, 2007 WL 2410346 (D.N.D. Aug. 21, 2007).
12. Tweed v. Schuetzle, No. 1:06-CV-032, 2007 WL 2050782 (D.N.D. July 12, 2007).
(Plaintiff was Tweed).
13. Tweed v. Schuetzle, No. 1:06-CV-032, 2007 WL 2050782 (D.N.D. July 12, 2007).
(Plaintiff was Moses).
14. Wedemeyer v. City of Williston unknown transport officers, No. 107-CV-033,
2007 WL 1855050 (D.N.D. June 26, 2007). (Against Williston City Police).
15. Wedemeyer v. City of Williston unknown transport officers, No. 107-CV-033,
2007 WL 1855050 (D.N.D. June 26, 2007). (Against Williams County Sheriff).
16. Wedemeyer v. City of Williston unknown transport officers, No. 107-CV-033,
2007 WL 1855050 (D.N.D. June 26, 2007).
(Against North Dakota Department of Corrections).
17. Cody v. White, No. 3:06-CV-18, 2007 WL 1726583 (D.N.D. June 13, 2007).
18. Odom v. Brutger Equities, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-038, 2007 WL 1611923
(D.N.D. June 01, 2007).
19. Clifford v. Mueller, No. 3:07-CV-44, 2007 WL 1521043 (D.N.D. May 22, 2007).
20. Burke v. North Dakota Dept. of Corrs. and Rehab., No. 1:07 CV 004, 2007 WL
1456217 (D.N.D. May 16, 2007).
21. Moore v. Schuetzle, No. 1:06-CV-079, 2006 WL 3612857 (D.N.D. Nov. 20, 2006).
(Against North Dakota Department of Corrections)
22. Moore v. Schuetzle, No. 1:06-CV-079, 2006 WL 3612857 (D.N.D. Nov. 20, 2006).
(Against Fargo City Police).
23. Mora v. North Dakota, No. 1:07-CV-023, 2007 WL 1147060
(D.N.D. Mar. 29, 2007).
24. Garcia v. Schull, No. 2:05-CV-50, 2007 WL 295614 (D.N.D. Jan. 29, 2007).
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(Against Grand Forks City Police).
25. Garcia v. Schull, No. 2:05-CV-50, 2007 WL 295614 (D.N.D. Jan. 29, 2007).
(Against Grand Forks County Sheriff).
26. Hart v. Bertsch, No. 1:06-CV-080, 2006 WL 3544393 (D.N.D. Nov. 2, 2006).
27. Kunze v. Bertsch, No. 1:05-CV-104, 2006 WL 267150 (D.N.D. Jan. 4, 2006).
28. Shape v. Barnes County, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (D.N.D. Oct. 14, 2005).
29. Brown ex rel. Indigenous Inmates at N.D. State Prison v. Schuetzle, 368 F.Supp.2d
1009 (D.N.D. May 4, 2005).
30. Harvey v. County of Ward, 352 F.Supp.2d 1003 (D.N.D. 2005).
31. Kunze v. Rauser, 332 F.Supp.2d 1269 (D.N.D. 2004).
32. Moore v. Bachmeier, No. A1-04-38, 2004 WL 1167380 (D.N.D. May 25, 2004).
33. Damron v. North Dakota Com’r of Corrs., 299 F.Supp.2d 970 (D.N.D. 2004).
34. Daniels v. Anderson, No. A1-02-125, 2003 WL 21704396 (D.N.D. July 15, 2003).
(Against Stark County Sheriff).
35. Daniels v. Anderson, No. A1-02-125, 2003 WL 21704396 (D.N.D. July 15, 2003).
(Against Dickinson City Police).
36. Shirley v. Dietz, No. A3-99-120, 2000 WL 33340305 (D.N.D. Nov. 7, 2000).
37. Westfall v. City of Grand Forks, No. A2-99-2, 2000 WL 33339627
(D.N.D. Aug. 2, 2000).
38. Hendrickson v. Griggs County ex rel. Bd. of County Comm’r, No. A3-99-36, 2000
WL 33339621 (D.N.D. April 18, 2000).
39. Schneeweis v. City of Grand Forks, No. A3-98-76, 1999 WL 33279853
(D.N.D. July 15, 1999).
40. Burke v. Meyers, No. A3-97-99, 1998 WL 1780695 (D.N.D. July 27, 1998).
41. Copper v. City of Fargo, No. A3-93-130, 1998 WL 1780672
(D.N.D. Mar. 31, 1998).
42. Veneklase v. City of Fargo, No. A3-93-156, 1998 WL 1780688
(D.N.D. Mar. 31, 1998).
43. Pipes v. North Dakota, No. 1:07-CV-00067, 2007 WL 4661655
(D.N.D. Dec. 10, 2007). (Against Mountrail County Sheriff).
44. Pipes v. North Dakota, No. 1:07-CV-00067, 2007 WL 4661655
(D.N.D. December 10, 2007). (Against North Dakota Department of Corrections).
45. Billings v. North Dakota State Penitentiary, No. 1:07-CV-066, 2007 WL 4380056
(D.N.D. Oct. 26, 2007).
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